Enemies of Liberal Democracy

 Enemies of Liberal Democracy

 

What is “liberal democracy” in a multicultural society, where citizens have different, and often opposing, beliefs and viewpoints, many grounded in absolute, or fairly absolute, conceptions of the world?

 

One theory of liberal democracy is that it is a system, not for resolving differences, but for managing them, grounded by respect for the equality of all citizens, and in the justice of its institutions.

 

In classic liberal theory, debate between opposing ideas has been sacred. In recent classic liberal theory, most notably exemplified by the US political philosopher John Rawls, the idea has been promoted that citizens (and their representatives) should bring to the “public square” (political debate) arguments that may be partisan but that are comprehensible to their opponents. Arguments expressed in terms that are particular to a faction (for example, purely religious arguments) must be left behind. This is domain of “public reason”, according to Rawls.

 

Public institutions, the courts, voters indeed, should follow public reason in reaching decisions, and not directly urge or impose their own religious or sectarian secular worldview on their fellow citizens, even if their public reasons are motivated by partisan ones.

 

Thus, a liberal democracy can function reasonably well even if its constituent parts are in some fundamental disagreements. One may have a particular worldview, but one must advance “public reasons” for that worldview to influence public policy. Examples, according to Rawls, might be debating abortion in terms of the sanctity of life; or same sex marriage in terms of the alleged better stability of the conventional marriage for promoting family life.

 

According to the theory, although liberal democratic decisions may result in policy or laws that are contrary to particular worldviews (eg on abortion or marriage), those holding such worldviews accept, with personal reluctance, the policies or laws reached in accordance with public reason. However, they may, of course be determined to continue to challenge policy or law – in accordance with public reason.

 

But recent times have shown that this theory of liberal toleration is, well, a bit Liberal. It was a caveat of Rawls’s theory that liberal democracy could not accommodate unyielding fundamentalism of any religious or secular stripe. He was writing at the time when Islamist movements, especially, were surgent. But he also has in mind ideologies of dictatorship or oligarchy, historical or modern.

 

In the US of the 1990s, when Rawls developed these ideas, the seeds of hyper-partisanship were being sown. In the years since, the ideal of the public square, where policy is debated in accordance with public reason, has been systematically trashed.

 

The structure suggested by Rawls has proved to be a paper tent. A determined faction can kick it down.

In December 1648, after Charles 1 had lost the English Civil War, but before he was tried and executed for treason, there was strong support in Parliament for his negotiated return to the throne with limited powers. The Cromwellian Army sent troops to block those sympathetic MPs from attending Parliament, arresting many.

Ring any bells?

 

Perhaps this is because, as some critics have argued, Rawls’s theory is itself partisan, designed to draw the teeth of robust right-wing politics (in the case of the US).

 

This is true, up to a point. But theorists of democratic states, including the Founding Fathers of the US Constitution, have always been wary of “factionalism” – the potential of democratic processes to deliver a political majority that oppresses the minority (alleged modern examples abound – Turkey; India).

 

The US constitution is designed to thwart the power of political Faction. Rawls’s theory is a plea to responsible citizens to avoid it.

 

But… Faction has so many channels to flow through – divisive news providers, social media, not to forget the permanent presence of unscrupulous politicians.

 

In the US, in past few months, Faction has roared like a motorcycle gang into the public square, and sits there belching discord. Faction has been engaged in a full-throated, full-hearted, full-booted assault on the US political process. The pillars of democracy sway and creak.

 

Apart from one pillar. Rawls said that his theory required an impartial, fair, judicial system, devoted to public reason. The US senior judiciary has been endlessly criticised for being politicised, administrations packing benches with judges favourable to their worldviews. In other words, instead of checking Faction, it is claimed that the judiciary embodies it to a greater or lesser degree.

 

But the current factional war has proved a political move too far it seems, even for a judiciary with a conservative bias. They have resisted Faction’s lawsuits, pretty much unanimously.

 

Indeed, there seems, for the present, a self-imposed limit on Faction’s assault. Judicial decisions are, for the time being, respected, with reluctance.

 

What will Faction do, in the US? Accept with gritted teeth the legal bare bones of the new administration, but set up oppositional camp outside the walls of constitutional legitimacy, outside the paper fences of liberal democracy?

 

That’s the combative, aggressive, potentially and actually violent threat to liberal democracy. There’s another kind of faction. It is perhaps more insidious. It shares some of the same preoccupations, especially xenophobia. It is characterised, not by aggressive fury, but by frivolous contempt. It is what we have at present in the UK. Many Tories don’t purport to be serious governors of the country. They don’t have to engage with public reason. They are merely entitled to be at the helm. They are willing to undermine any legal or conventional obstacle to their entitlement. Back to the country they give very little, except obfuscation and bombast.

 

Jan 2021