Misleading Analogies in the Debate about
Free Will
(There are many.)
To start with, some
definitions and working assumptions:
· “Free Will”, in its classical sense, denotes the claim that, in
important respects, human beings are ultimately responsible for their
decisions, moral and other (but especially moral). It is “up to us” (and no
other cause which isn’t us) whether we decide to A or to B. The existence of
this faculty grounds moral responsibility.
· “Determinism”
is the idea that the Universe in all
its manifestations, including humans, proceeds according to iron laws of
causation, such that any state of it at any time is determined by the
pre-existing state and the operation of the laws, and so on infinitely
backwards, and forwards. No human faculty can, as it were, outwit the Universe.
· “Indeterminism”
denotes the claim that determinism is
false. The chief scientific evidence for the claim is that, at the quantum
level, randomness or probability rule, or appear to. It has been pointed out
that that neither of these qualities fits well with the classical notion of
Free Will.
· “Compatibilism”
denotes the claim that some notion of
free will (if not, perhaps, the classical version) can be rescued, even if
determinism is true.
· “Incompatibilism” is the claim which asserts the opposite: either by
gloomily concluding that, if determinism is true, there’s no free will and no
moral responsibility, and we are all doomed to an amoral Hell (or somewhere
less pregnant with blame) in a determinist handcart; or by defiantly denying
that determinism is true, at least so far as humans are concerned. Two main
lines of argument come in here – either some version of the (quasi) dualistic
notion of classical theory, by which some sort of human agency sits above
physics and biology, or at least is a uniquely special feature of human
biology; or the view that that free will is no more than a comfortable
illusion, and that every millimetre of our lives’ paths are plotted from
eternity.
(As a major aside, these
debates may never be settled until an account of “consciousness” is
satisfactorily arrived at. The epicentre of arguments about free will is the
role of ofconscious reflection and decision-making.)
· An assumption: we do reflect and do make decisions,
even if we are not ultimately responsible
for those reflections and decisions. I suggest below that our reflecting and
decision-making give the lie to certain well-worn similes and metaphors.
· Another assumption: humans are not dualist in nature
but belong to the natural world. In particular, “minds” are properties of
brains (an assumption contested by, especially, those who believe in souls
or similar metaphysical substances or properties).
Marionettes and storm-tossed ships
Many misleading analogies
mislead because they smuggle in some sort of dualism. Consider the image of the
marionette. If determinism is true, are we humans not all marionettes,
controlled by invisible strings manipulated by the laws of nature or other implacable
deterministic force?
But consider what is
fundamentally wrong with this image. It implies that, on the one hand, there
are laws of nature and the unfolding universe. On the other hand, there are
inert beings waiting passively to be animated by such forces. The image places
humans (or an essential part of them) outside
of the system governed by the laws, indeed makes humans playthings of the
law. That is a misrepresentation (even if determinism is true). Humans are
immensely complex beings, even we are part of the natural universe and governed
by its laws. We take decisions; learn from success, mistakes, the teaching,
encouragement and blame of others; and, crucially, our own reflection and
reasoning – if our minds/brains are well-ordered and not impaired by disease,
deficiency or (to beg a question) coercion.
Marionettes we are not. We do
reflect and make choices for which we can be held responsible. Even if what eventuates is in some sense
determined, there is a chasm of difference between the fatalism of the marionette imagery – where “we” just wait to be
jerked one way or another – the fact of our multiply complex participation in the world.
Lying in bed waiting for out there to pluck our strings does not accord
with human reality (except in adolescent years).
What of another favoured
image, that of the captain on a ship’s bridge, who naively thinks that s/he is
controlling the ship by spinning the wheel; whereas the truth is that the wheel
connects to nothing, and the ship is tossed upon the seas of universal
necessity?
Again- a dualist mistake:
ship and captain are one; the whole is well fitted for riding and navigating
the waves, and using their power.
Reflective and unconscious action
There is another mistake, or
fetish: to do with the alleged primacy of reflective decision making in our
lives. Clearly it is important, however its psychological and physical
mechanisms work: attachments, places of work and living, becoming parents, may
depend on long, hard thought. But in many aspects of our lives the opposite is
true: we strive to eliminate reflection – “thought” is the enemy of competence,
in most sports, driving a car or riding a bike, and many routine tasks.
We aspire to train ourselves,
or be trained, or just grow to learn, to take many decisions “instinctively” or
unconsciously – as part of a deterministic universe?
When one is driving on a
motorway in the winter’s dark and rain, one trusts that one’s, and others’,
driving skills are meshed in response to the conditions and will deliver a safe
outcome. But we should not usually say that the manoeuvres others and we make
are evidence of a lack of free will, or that the mistakes we might make, for
example a fractional lateness in braking or steering, are “not our fault”. We
seek to be responsive to many such very immediate elements of life, and agree
to be held responsible, even if the conditions in and upon which we act are not
matters for which we have ultimate responsibility.
Finally – an interesting
self-experiment. When you are next lying in bed after waking (and are not
determined in your rising by an implacable alarm and timetable), introspect the
following sequence: “I should get up” (decision *1); “I get up” (decision *2). I suggest that *2 is not
usually a reflective one – you just get up. But *1 has set the conditions – the
resolution in favour of getting up that *2 unreflectively delivers.
That is a model for many of
our actions (including writing passages
of essays!)
Sept 2016
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