Understanding the Causes of Murderous
Militancy
(This post sets out my thoughts after
reading some expert commentaries. It is does not purport to contain any
original, let alone expert, views. It also concentrates on a historical
perspective, rather than examining the process of radicalisation of Western
citizens.)
Since Tudor times, Roman
Catholics, or some of them, have been praying for the “Conversion of England”.
Indeed, one eminent modern clergyman says that England should be viewed as a
“lapsed” catholic country, so that praying for England’s conversion is
equivalent to prayer for restoration of a lapsed catholic to the True Faith.
Catholic prayer, and
associated missionary work, has been for a long time, and remains, strictly
aspirational. Any militancy in the cause belonged largely to the Tudor and
Stuart eras. It was pretty heavyweight in its time, consisting of what was in
effect a Spanish crusade against England, martyrdom missions and, of course, an
attempted terrorist spectacular under the Houses of Parliament.
The animating principle
behind this history, bloody or otherwise, is the desire of those of one form of
religious persuasion to reclaim what they regard as rightfully theirs, in a
political-religious sense (cf Israel). It is a fruitful starting point for a
quest to understand, to some degree, Islamic militancy to consider what the
political extent and power of Islam once was compared to its state now.
From its earliest times and
for many centuries, Islam was extraordinarily good at conquering or
“converting” countries, and holding them. As well as Arabia, the Islamic world
included North Africa, India, Central Asia, Turkey, the Balkans – and, for
hundreds of years, most of Spain. Today, all that geographical extent is much
diminished.
Not only has territory
shrunk: such countries that remain nominally Islamic to greater or lesser
extent have often been plagued by corrupt and/or autocratic governments and
economic stagnation or failure.
That geo-political phenomenon
know loosely as “the West”, especially in its own various empire-building modes
or as a by-product of its own wars, has largely brought about, between the 16th
and 20th centuries, the diminution of political Islam’s prestige and
power.
The historical record can,
without huge distortion of the facts, be interpreted as a deliberate and
successful assault on the Muslim religion itself, a continuation, as it were,
of the medieval crusades. Muslims have been the humiliated victims of Western
“aggression”, so the narrative goes.
As already briefly mentioned,
matters are made worse by the political and economic failures and instabilities
of modern Muslim-majority states (or ex-states). Experiments in democracy,
socialism, nationalism, or a mixture of these features, have mostly foundered.
There have emerged, as often as not, harsh repressive regimes or anarchy. There
is little in current conventional Islamic politics for a Muslim conscious of a
better past to be proud of.
Historical decline and
current turmoil in the Islamic world has coincided in recent times with a
religious revival. (I stress again that, especially in this area, I have no
qualification to analyse this but am accepting the word of many expert scholars
and commentators.)
Central to this revival have
been to extremely conservative religious traditions in Islam: Salafism (also
known as Wahhabism) , emanating from Saudi Arabia and the Deobandi school from
Pakistan. Both are uncompromisingly traditional, supporting Sharia law, and all
the rules concerning the conduct and dress of women, blasphemy, apostasy,
homosexuality and, usually, promoting directly or indirectly anti-Semitism.
These traditions are
especially suspicious of, or hostile to, Western “materialist” values and
“decadence” (which is not necessarily
the same thing as hostility to all things or persons Western, as many people of
many religions or none in the West would agree). The Deobandis formed in 19th
century Imperial India as a movement committed to withdrawal from British
influence, rather than militant opposition to it.
Saudi millions (or billions)
have paid for the plantation of Salafist mosques and clergy throughout the
Islamic world. Deobandi conservatism has spread from Pakistan, via the Taliban,
to Afghanistan and, in particular to Britain among the Muslims of South East
Asian heritage.
There is, then, political
uncertainty and alienation (especially for many Muslim communities in western
states) and a widespread avocation of fundamentalist principles. This doesn’t
add up of itself to militancy. Like many religious people, observant Muslims
turn in to their communities and navigate the outside with greater or less
success.
But here is also the starting
point for the Islamist pitch: the Islamic world has been degraded both by
Western aggression and the failures of its regimes. It is only by returning to
the religious and political principles of the religion’s early times that Islam
can be re-set on the right path.
This initial message is
easier to convey when the ascendant religious schools are extremely
conservative. Their many followers (perhaps the majority of practising Muslims)
would perhaps not have a great problem with stricter observance and the
adoption of Sharia.
But after this beginning the
message, is by degrees, more contentious. A moderate Islamist would urge
normal, peaceful political means to pursue the Islamist agenda. But what if
political action is balked, as it often has been (Algeria, Egypt)? Or what, as
extreme Islamists urge, the religion itself prescribes direct, violent action –
a Jihad indeed, in the sense of struggle to defend and free Islam from outside
intervention and corrupt rulers? Further, what if the religion itself
prescribes aggressive struggle against the non-Islamic world – a militant duty
to carry the faith worldwide?
These propositions are, of
course, all highly contentious within Islam, even in the fundamentalist schools
(one example: it is argued that war may only be waged by lawful governments).
It is said against the extreme Islamists that they pick out verses of the
Qur’an, sayings of the Prophet and episodes of early Islamic history to justify
violence against Islam’s, or Allah’s, perceived enemies. A more moderate interpretation
of these matters might suggest, for example, that these verses, sayings and
actions held good for their times, and are no more to be followed now than
similar bloodthirsty injunctions in the Old Testament. Judaism and Islam were
both, in their early days, “authoritarian theocracies”.
Theological waters have been,
on the other hand, undoubtedly muddied by the actual wars launched on Islamic
territories in recent times, first by the Soviets and then by the US and
allies. These helped the extremist argument. And it must not be forgotten that
there have been jihadist struggles against Western imperialism further back in
history. Militancy is not a new phenomenon in Islam.
So far it is relatively easy to
follow and to an extent understand the historical roots and more recent causes
of Islamism as an anti Western, anti local regimes. What is very difficult to
comprehend is the aggressive murderousness that extreme Islamism has embraced
in modern times. It is even more difficult to understand why so many
individuals commit to this lethal ideology and are willing to carry out its
crimes.
Modern extreme Islamists
(including Osama Bin Laden) justify this turn by reference again to contentious
aspects of early Islam. The Prophet, as well as being a religious leader, was also
a politician and warrior who may have been responsible for, or at least
condoned, some episodes of savagery against non-Muslims. From this (debated)
history extreme Islamists have spun a narrative that the lives of unbelievers,
and even of their children, are of no worth and may be legitimately be taken in
the course of Jihad against Islam’s enemies. (One influential extremist ideologue has written: "The brutality of beheading is intended, even delightful to God and his Prophet..".)
Pushing this horrible belief
into the minds of fanatics, or the minds of the weak and deracinated, is final
step in destroying their human empathy- but still a step almost impossible to
understand.
It is a frightening thought
that, so long as a militant interpretation of early Islam remains plausible,
there will be those who will adopt it and some who will act on it.
Unfortunately the prevalent conservative schools of modern Islam are perhaps
not best placed to contest the extreme interpretation, as they share many of
the attitudes (for example, distrust of the West, belittling of unbelievers,
especially Jews) which animate the nihilist worldview.
I have found the following
books and articles useful. They contain far greater knowledge and historical
heft than my distillation.
Jason Burke – The New Threat from Islamic Militancy. Perhaps the best general introduction to the
historical perspective. Takes the story up to 2015 and the Charlie Hebdo attacks.
Innes Bowen – Medina in Birmingham, Najaf in Brent. A dispassionate survey of modern British Islam, noting
the prevalence of conservative schools.
9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2. An account of the ideology behind Al Qaeda.
Donald Holbrook – Using the Qur’an to Justify
Terrorist Violence (“Perspectives on
Terrorism” online journal)
Jim Muir – IS Group: the Full Story. BBC website 11/03/2016
March 2016
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